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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal arises from the denial of a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.2241. 
The petitioner, Edwin P. Wilson, a federal prisoner, 
attempted to contract for the murders of several people 
while he was in federal custody, but prior to the date on 
which the penitentiary received him for service of his 
sentence. He alleges that the United States Parole 
Commission violated its own rules when it applied the 
rescission guidelines of 28 C.F.R. 2.36 to his conduct, 
when the regulation's plain language applies only to 
"disciplinary infractions or new criminal behavior 
committed by a prisoner subsequent to the commencement 
of his sentence." The district court held that the Parole 
Commission's interpretation of its own guidelines was 
reasonable because Wilson was in federal custody awaiting 
trial on another indictment at the time of the new 
criminal behavior and denied the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. Since, however, the same Parole 
Commission regulations at 28 C.F.R. 2.10 define sentence 
commencement as "the date on which the person is 
received at the penitentiary . . . ," we find that the Parole 
Commission contravened its regulation to which it is 
bound. We will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
As of June 23, 1997, when Wilson filed the petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus now before the court, he had been 
confined for almost 14 years and incarcerated in the United 
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States Penitentiary at Allenwood, in White Deer, 
Pennsylvania, serving a 52-year aggregate federal sentence. 
 
In 1982, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia sentenced Wilson to 15 years (later modified to 
10), for transportation of firearms in interstate commerce 
with intent to commit a felony. According to the 
Presentence Investigation Reports, in 1979, Wilson had 
conspired to export four revolvers and supply them to a 
Libyan intelligence officer. One of the revolvers was used to 
murder a Libyan dissident. 
 
In 1983, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Texas sentenced Wilson to a 17-year term, to run 
consecutively to the Virginia sentence, for conspiracy to 
violate the Arms Export Control Act, fraudulent statements, 
violations of the Munitions Control Act, and unlawful 
transportation of hazardous material. Wilson had conspired 
in 1977 to import 20 tons of C-4 plastic explosives into 
Libya. These explosives were used, in part, to train 
terrorists. 
 
Finally, in the fall of 1983, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced 
Wilson to a 25-year consecutive sentence for attempted 
murder, criminal solicitation, obstruction of justice, 
tampering with witnesses, and retaliating against 
witnesses. Wilson had been charged with arranging for the 
contract murder of eight people, including making a cash 
payment delivered by his son, to a person whom he 
believed to be a hitman, but who was actually an FBI 
agent. All of this was committed while Wilson was awaiting 
trial or sentencing on the other charges, and continued 
after the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia sentenced him in 1982. Although during 
this time Wilson was in federal custody, he had not yet 
been received at a federal prison under a judgment of 
sentence. 
 
In 1992, the Parole Commission denied Wilson parole 
and rated Wilson's Virginia and Texas offenses as Category 
Eight severity. Combined with Wilson's salient factor score 
of ten points, the parole guideline range equaled 100+ 
months. 28 C.F.R. 2.20. Next, the Parole Commission 
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considered criminal conduct committed while Wilson was in 
federal custody, before and after sentencing in Virginia. The 
Commission rated this conduct under the rescission 
guidelines, applicable to "new criminal behavior committed 
by a prisoner subsequent to the commencement of his 
sentence and prior to his release on parole." 28 C.F.R. 
2.36 (a). 
 
The Parole Commission rated the rescission conduct as 
Category Eight severity, finding that it constituted 
conspiracy to commit murder, and recalculated Wilson's 
salient factor score as if he had committed new crimes 
while on parole, producing six points. Thus, the Parole 
Commission, following the rescission guidelines, added 
120+ months to the original 100+ months, more than 
doubling Wilson's aggregate guideline range to 220+ 
months. The National Appeals Board affirmed on 
administrative appeal. The Parole Commission scheduled a 
reconsideration hearing for October, 2007. 
 
On August 8, 1996, the Parole Commission held a 
statutory interim hearing, and the case was again referred 
to the National Commission, which maintained the previous 
order. The National Appeals Board affirmed this decision, 
issuing a final notice of action on August 1, 1997, 
confirming the use of the rescission guidelines. 
 
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Wilson 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U. S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
alleging that the Commission applied its rescission 
guidelines in an arbitrary and capricious manner in 
extending his parole eligibility date. The district court 
denied the petition. 
 
Wilson filed a timely notice of appeal on July 30, 1998. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
 1291. In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, we exercise 
plenary review of the district court's legal conclusions. See 
Jones v. Lilly, 37 F.3d 964, 967 (3d Cir. 1994). Generally, 
federal courts defer to Parole Commission's decisions. See 
Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 690-91 (3d Cir. 1976). 
When reviewing a Parole Commission decision, however, we 
must determine whether the Commission "has followed 
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criteria appropriate, rational and consistent with its 
enabling statute and that its decision is not arbitrary and 
capricious, nor based on impermissible considerations." Id. 
at 690. 
 
II. 
 
The central question before us is whether Wilson's 
criminal conduct triggers the application of the rescission 
guidelines, thus prolonging incarceration before parole 
eligibility. Our starting point on any question concerning 
the application of a regulation is its particular written text. 
See generally Sutherland, Statutory Construction  45 - 47 
(5th ed.)(1991). 28 C.F.R. 2.36 provides: 
 
       2.36 Rescission guidelines. 
 
        (a) The following guidelines shall apply to the 
       sanctioning of disciplinary infractions or new criminal 
       behavior committed by a prisoner subsequent to 
       the commencement of his sentence and prior to his 
       release on parole. These guidelines specify the 
       customary time to be served for such behavior which 
       shall be added to the time required by the original 
       presumptive or effective date. Credit shall be given 
       towards service of these guidelines for any time spent 
       in custody on a new offense that has not been credited 
       towards service of the original presumptive or effective 
       date . . . (emphasis added). 
 
A statute, clear and unambiguous on its face, will not be 
interpreted by a court; only statutes which are of doubtful 
meaning are subject to the process of statutory 
interpretation. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414 (1899). 
We must give the natural and customary meaning to the 
words, and if that is plain, our sole function is to enforce 
it according to its terms. Caminetti v. United States, 242 
U.S. 470, 485 (1917), United Pacific Nat. Cellular v. United 
States, 41 Fed. Cl. 20, 26-27 (1998). 
 
The meaning of the pertinent part of section 2.36 is clear 
and unambiguous. "New criminal behavior" necessarily 
distinguishes the criminal behavior which activates the 
rescission guidelines from the "old" criminal behavior, 
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which is the crime underlying the incarceration; "committed 
by a prisoner," that is, done by one in prison, "subsequent 
to," after, "the commencement of his sentence." Not only is 
"the commencement of his sentence" clear to us on its face, 
but another section of the same regulations, 28 C.F.R. 
2.10, specifically defines "service of a sentence" in accord 
with common usage: 
 
       2.10 Date service of sentence commences. 
 
        (a) Service of a sentence of imprisonment commences 
       to run on the date on which the person is received 
       at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service 
       of the sentence: Provided, however, that any such 
       person shall be allowed credit toward the service of his 
       sentence for any days spent in custody in connection 
       with the offense or acts for which sentence was 
       imposed. (emphasis added). 
 
As a rule, a definition which declares what a term means is 
binding, National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp ., 687 F.2d 
1122 (8th Cir. 1982), and "[a] definition which declares 
what a term `means' . . . excludes any meaning that is not 
stated." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 - 393 
(1978), citing 2A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction 47.07 (4th ed., Supp. 1978), See Leber v. 
Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 780 F.2d 372, 376 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
 
We also note that Congress's criminal procedure 
provisions provided the identical definition of 
commencement of sentence at 18 U.S.C. 3568 (applicable 
to Wilson's sentence though now superseded by section 
3585) which reads in pertinent part: 
 
       3568. Effective date of sentence; credit for time in 
       custody prior to the imposition of sentence 
 
        The sentence of imprisonment of any person 
       convicted of an offense shall commence to run from 
       the date on which such person is received at the 
       penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such 
       sentence. The Attorney General shall give any such 
       person credit toward service of his sentence for any 
       days spent in custody in connection with the offense or 
       acts for which sentence was imposed.... 
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Because the Parole Commission's interpretation conflicts 
with Congress's description of the commencement of a 
sentence in section 3568, it must be rejected on those 
grounds as well. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 
825 (1980) (agency's interpretation of the statute cannot 
supersede Congress's chosen language). 
 
The last act in Wilson's criminal conduct was on 
February 10, 1983, when the F.B.I. agent posing as a 
hitman met with Wilson's son. Between Wilson's 
subsequent arrest and trial in New York, Wilson was 
sentenced in the Texas case and tried and acquitted on 
other charges in the District of Columbia. He was tried in 
New York on the attempted murder charges, among others, 
and sentenced on November 9, 1983. The following day, 
November 10, 1983, Wilson was delivered to the United 
States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, to serve his sentence. 
 
The commencement of Wilson's sentence was, thus, 
November 10, 1983, when he was committed to the Marion 
Penitentiary; all other definitions of the commencement of 
Wilson's sentence are excluded. 
 
Exclusion of other definitions of "commencement of 
sentence" is not only required by the plain language but 
also by the regulation taken as a whole. Regulation2.36 
cautiously circumscribes the subject time period: time 
served at the prison between arrival at the prison and 
release on parole. Further, the regulation provides that 
"[c]redit shall be given towards service of these guidelines 
for any time spent in custody on a new offense," also 
differentiating the time serving the sentence in prison from 
"time spent in custody on a new offense." 
 
III. 
 
The Parole Commission determined that Wilson's 
sentence commenced to run when he was first received into 
federal custody. The District Court agreed, asserting that 
"[t]he Commission's interpretation of its own guidelines as 
to when a sentence commences to run for the purpose of 
determining when an offense was committed is entitled to 
deference." 
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We find that the Parole Commission's interpretation is 
entitled to no deference as to the narrow question of when 
a sentence commences to run; the plain language of the 
regulation controls. Although courts often substantially 
defer to an agency's construction of its own regulations, 
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n , 
499 U.S. 144, 150, 111 S. Ct. 1171, 1175 - 1176, 113 L. 
Ed.2d. 117 (1991), and the Parole Commission enjoys a 
great deal of deference as to decisions regarding whether to 
grant parole to a particular individual, only where the 
meaning of a regulation is ambiguous should the reviewing 
court give effect to the agency's "reasonable interpretation," 
i.e., an interpretation which "sensibly conforms to the 
purpose and wording of the regulation . . . ." Id., 499 U.S. 
at 151, 111 S. Ct. At 1176, (quoting Northern Indiana Pub. 
Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League 
of Am., 423 U.S. 12, 15, 96 S. Ct. 172, 173, 46 L. Ed.2d 
156 (1975)). 
 
Here, no deference is warranted because the Parole 
Commission's interpretation is inconsistent with the 
wording of the regulation. See id., 499 U.S. at 158. The 
administering agency's interpretation of a provision 
becomes relevant only if neither the plain meaning nor the 
legislative history determine interpretation of the provision, 
Stanley Work v. Snydergeneral Corp, 781 F.Supp. 659, 663 
(E.D.Ca. 1990). We defer only where an agency's 
interpretation sensibly conforms to the purpose and the 
wording of the regulation.1 Martin, 499 U.S. at 151 (1991). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We recognize that the district court concluded that the Parole 
Commission's interpretation is reasonable: 
 
       The Commission's interpretation is reasonable in that, for 
rescission 
       guidelines purposes, it would make little sense to differentiate 
       between a sentenced prisoner, who was in federal custody awaiting 
       trial on another indictment, from one who was not faced with 
       another indictment and had begun serving his sentence at a 
       designated prison. 
 
This conclusion cannot stand where the Parole Commission's 
interpretation contravenes the regulation's plain language. Indeed, we 
have previously rejected just such an equation between federal custody 
and commencement of a sentence. In Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156 
 
                                8 
The Parole Commission must determine that new 
criminal conduct occurred within the time circumscribed by 
the rescission guidelines before applying those rescission 
guidelines to a prisoner's parole eligibility date. 
Fundamentally, the Parole Commission must follow its own 
regulations, which have the force of law. United States ex 
rel Farese v. Luther, 953 F.2d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 1992), 
Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 943 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Wilson's criminal conduct, including his attempt to contract 
for eight murders while he was in federal custody, occurred 
prior to the "commencement of his sentence." Faced with 
the facts before it, the Parole Commission should not have 
concluded that Wilson's sentence "commenced" earlier 
while he was in federal custody. We conclude that the 
district court erred in finding the rescission guidelines 
applicable to Wilson's parole eligibility calculation. 
 
IV. 
 
Therefore, we will vacate the district court's judgment 
and remand the case with directions to the Parole 
Commission to recalculate Wilson's parole eligibility date. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(3d Cir. 1998), Ernesto Gambino, a notorious member of an organized 
crime family, attempted to escape from secure custody, and the Parole 
Commission added additional time before his eligibility for parole. 
Though the Parole Commission did not indicate under which provision of 
the regulations Gambino's additional penalty was assessed, we 
concluded that, on the regulation's face, the rescission guidelines could 
not apply, inasmuch as the attempted escape was prior to the verdict 
and thus, necessarily, prior to the commencement of Gambino's 
sentence. Id. at 158 and fn. 4. Plainly, the regulation does distinguish 
between a sentenced prisoner in federal custody and one who has begun 
serving his sentence at a designated prison. 
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